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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030284-CA

vs.
JEAN FRED VENORD,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
*

&

ik

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appealsfroma conviction for assault by a prisoner, a third degree felony,
in violation ofUtah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1999). This Court hasjurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Where defendant's status as a prisoner was an element of the offense and defendant's
self-defense claim relied on his past experience in jail, was defendant's trial attorney
constitutionally ineffective in eliciting testimony from defendant that he was in the jail on a
warrant for shoplifting and had previously served one year in jail for possession of a
controlled substance?
Standard ofReview. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first
time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, «{| 6, 89 P.3d 162.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const amend VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have
the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

Defendant was charged with two counts of assault by a prisoner, third degree felonies,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.5(1999). R. 5. He waived a preliminary hearing
and a jury trial was scheduled. R. 38,43. The jury found defendant not guilty of count I, but
guilty of count II. R. 102-99,187. After resolving a number of pro se motions by defendant,
the court sentenced defendant to a suspended prison term of zero-to-five years and placed
him on supervised probation. R. 294, 321-18. Defendant timely appealed. R. 312.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

On February 13,2003, defendant was arrested on a warrant for shoplifting and taken
to the Utah County Jail. R. 347: 70-71,123. Following an inventory search, he was escorted
to the booking room to be processed and given a cell assignment. R. 347: 84-85. Two other
arrestees—Michael Phillips and Brady Carnes—had just been fingerprinted and were
awaiting their cell assignments in an area partitioned off the booking room by a three-foot
dividing wall. R. 347: 71, 84.l After fingerprinting defendant, Deputy Peter Quittner
instructed defendant to join the other two men in the waiting area. R. 347: 71.

1

The waiting area has a television, several benches, and telephones. R. 347: 80, 88.
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After defendant walked through the gate into the waiting area, Phillips, who was
sitting on one of the benches, raised his arm up and struck defendant on the left side of his
face. R. 347: 124. In response, defendant swung his hand backward and hit Phillips in the
mouth, causing his lip to bleed. R. 347: 126;; see also R. 374: 71, 100-01, 117. Deputy
Quittner, who only witnessed defendant's response, asked defendant if he had just hit
Phillips. R. 347: 72-73, 86-88.2 Defendant denied hitting Phillips, but Phillips and Carnes,
who was talking on one of the telephones, confirmed that he had. R. 347: 73-75, 87-88.
Asking one of the other deputies in the booking room to assist him, Deputy Quittner
instructed defendant to leave the waiting area and come with him to a holding cell. R. 347:
75, 90-91, 113. Defendant exited the waiting area and approached Deputy Quittner, who
was waiting for him at a cell. R. 347: 75, 91. However, just before reaching the deputy,
defendant jumped over the dividing wall back into the waiting area and assaulted Carnes as
he talked on the telephone. R. 347: 75-76, 91-92, 104-05, 115. Before officers could
intervene, defendant punched Carnes in the face and abdomen some ten to fifteen times. R.
347: 76, 92, 105-06, 111, 115. He also kicked him multiple times and kneed him in the
groin. R. 347: 76-77, 105-06. Carnes did not return punches, but assumed a defensive
position in trying to thwart off the blows. R. 347: 77, 107, 109, 115-16. Officers in the

2

Deputy Quittner testified that he watched defendant as he passed through the gate
and that defendant assaulted Phillips without provocation. R. 347: 71-74, 89-90, 99-100,
141-42. However, the Court reviews the record facts on appeal in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 2,10 P.3d 346. Because defendant was
acquitted of assaulting Phillips, the State recites the facts on count I consistent with
defendant's testimony.
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booking room did not observe Cames say or do anything to provoke defendant. R. 347:106,
114-15.
Deputy Quittner and at least two other officers separated defendant from Carnes and
placed him in restraints. R. 347:77-78,99,106,108-09,116-17. The officers escorted each
of the men to individual holding cells for safety reasons and summoned medical personnel to
examine the men. R. 347:78,117. Defendant refused any medical attention. R. 347:78-79,
118. Deputy Quittner asked defendant why he would do something like that, to which
defendant responded, "What did you expect me to do? He called me a f—ing nigger." R.
347: 79, 108. He then protested that he could not let that kind of thing go. R. 347: 108.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defense counsel was not ineffective in eliciting testimony that defendant was at the
jail on a warrant for shoplifting and that he had previously served one year in jail for
possession of drugs. Because defendant's status as a prisoner was an element of the offense,
the jury was already aware that he had been arrested for some crime. Rather than permitting
the jury to speculate about defendant's arrest, counsel reasonably made the jury aware that he
was only arrested for shoplifting. Moreover, evidence that defendant served one year in jail
was necessary to establish his self-defense theory that his actions were necessary in the
hostile jail environment. In any event, defendant's acquittal of one of the charges
demonstrates that the jury was not unduly prejudiced by the testimony.

4
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ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY DID
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

NOT

PROVIDE

On appeal, defendant contends that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective
because (1) he elicited testimony from defendant that he was at the Utah County Jail on a
warrant for shoplifting, and (2) he had previously served one year in jail for possession of a
controlled substance. Aplt. Brf. at 7-9. This claim fails.
To prevail on a claim that counsel did not provide constitutionally effective
assistance, defendant must meet the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Under that test, "defendant must show: (1) that
counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that
but for the deficient conduct defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome at
trial." Clark, 2004 UT 25, at \ 6; accord Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
Defendant has failed to satisfy either requirement.
"To satisfy the first part of the test, defendant must overcome the 'strong presumption
that [his] trial counsel rendered adequate assistance' by persuading the court that there was
no 'conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions.'" Clark, 2004 UT 25, at^j 6 (emphasis
in original) (internal citations omitted). This Court "cgive[s] trial counsel wide latitude in
making tactical decisions and will not question such decisions unless there is no reasonable
basis supporting them.'" Id. (quoting State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996)).
Contrary to defendant's claim, Aplt. Brf. at 9, his trial attorney had a reasonable basis for
eliciting testimony regarding both defendant's arrest and prior conviction.
5
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Defendant was charged with two counts of assault by a prisoner. R. 5. Accordingly,
the State was required to prove, as an element of the offense, that defendant was a prisoner.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1999) (providing that "[a]ny prisoner who commits
assault, intending to cause bodily injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree"). Where
the evidence established that defendant had been arrested for some unknown crime or
crimes, the jury might have speculated about defendant's crimes, imagining them to be more
serious than they were. Rather than face this risk, counsel might reasonably conclude that
defendant's prospects at trial were better if the jury was made aware of the reason for his
arrest. It was better for the jury to know that defendant was arrested on a warrant for
shoplifting than to speculate that he had been arrested for a crime of violence. Cf. Smulls v.
State, 71 S.W.3d 138,156 (Mo. 2002) {en banc) (holding that "[i]t is a common and proper
defense strategy to mention convictions first in order to soften the blow"), cert denied, 537
U.S. 1009, 123 S.Ct. 503 (2002); United States v. Williams, 939 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir.
1991) (recognizing that counsel might reasonably introduce a defendant's criminal history to
soften the impact later).
A decision to elicit testimony regarding defendant's conviction for possession of a
controlled substance was likewise reasonable. Defendant did not deny that he hit Phillips
and Carnes, but claimed that they represented a threat to him at the jail and he therefore acted

3

Although these cases addressed defense counsel's preemptive introduction of
evidence that could be introduced later by the prosecution, the strategy of ameliorating
potentially damaging evidence is equally reasonable here.
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in self-defense. R. 347: 124, 128-32; see also R. 347: 63-64, 156-58 (defense counsel's
opening statement and closing argument). In cross-examining Deputy Quittner, defense
counsel attempted to demonstrate that officers cannot always protect prisoners from other
prisoners. See R. 347: 94-97. To establish the immediacy of the threat at the jail and the
need to take proactive measures, defendant testified about his previous experience in the jail
and the consequences of not taking immediate action to defend oneself. R. 347: 127-32.
Trial counsel's decision to elicit this testimony, therefore, was an integral part of the defense
and sound trial strategy.
Additionally, the decision to acknowledge both crimes reflected a strategy to establish
defendant's candor and thus increase his credibility. See R. 347: 157 (stating in closing
argument that they "were not saying this is a perfect man who's never done anything
wrong"). Establishing the candor and honesty in a defendant is a valid trial strategy. See
State v. Moody, 779 So.2d 4, 10 (La. App. 2000) (accepting counsel's explanation that she
introduced defendant's prior arrests to establish his candor before the jury), cert denied, 803
So.2d 40 (La. 2000). Moreover, by making the jury aware that defendant's prior criminal
history consisted of only a drug possession conviction and a shoplifting arrest, counsel
removed any risk that the jury would speculate that he had a long or violent criminal history.
Defendant contends that because his prior crimes were inadmissible if offered by the
prosecution, his attorney's decision to introduce them was error. Aplt. Brf. at 9. This claim
is unavailing. Even where a successful objection to evidence could be made, counsel's
decision to refrain from objecting will not be deemed deficient if it "might be considered
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sound trial strategy." See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (internal quotes
omitted). As discussed, the decision to introduce the evidence was reasonable.
Defendant also fails to satisfy the second prong of the Stricklandtest.To satisfy the
second prong, defendant must show "that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial." Id. at 687,104 S.Ct. at 2064. "It is not enough for the defendant to
show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." Id. at
693, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. Instead, defendant must demonstrate that "but for his counsel's
deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would
have been different." State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37,42 (Utah 1996) {citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694,104 S.Ct. at 2068), abrogated on other grounds in State v. Litherland, 2000 UT
76, 12P.3d92.
Defendant claims, without explanation or analysis, that but for the admission of his
criminal history, "the jury would have returned a more favorable outcome." Aplt. Brf. at 9.
This bald claim is insufficient. Indeed, counsel's strategy worked at least in part—the jury
acquitted defendant of the first count charging him with assaulting Phillips. In the face of
the deputies' unwavering testimony that defendant assaulted both Phillips and Carnes
without provocation, it was no small accomplishment that defense counsel was successful in
obtaining an acquittal on one of the two counts. In any event, the jury's knowledge that
defendant was in jail would already have the effect of tainting defendant's image.
Admission of testimony demonstrating that his criminal history was neither long nor violent
would not add to that taint.
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* * *

Defendant has failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test. His claim therefore
fails. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069 (holding that the Court need not
"address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on
one").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted July 16, 2004.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

distant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee

9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 16, 2004,1 served two copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, Jean Fred Venord, by causing them to be delivered
by first class mail to his counsel of record as follows:
R. Paul ("Dusty") Kawai and
M. Paige Benjamin
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, UT 84603-0200

Je£re}?S. Gray
(Assistant Attorney General
E:\Venord Jea brf.doc
07/16/2004 9:44 PM

10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"~Z^

